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  We examine the welfare effects of product-line restrictions, such as those called for by 
some proponents of network neutrality regulation. We consider a platform that brings together 
households and application providers. We find that restricting a monopoly platform to a single 
product has the following effects: (a) application providers that would otherwise have purchased 
a low-quality variant are excluded from the market; (b) applications “in the middle” of the 
market utilize a higher and more efficient quality; and (c) applications at the top utilize a lower 
and less efficient quality than otherwise. Total surplus may rise or fall, although the analysis 
suggests to us that harm to welfare is likely. We also examine a duopoly model and find that the 
welfare effects are similar. 1 Introduction
Firms often oﬀer product lines—several variants of the same product. Ex-
amples include diﬀerent programming packages oﬀered by cable television
companies and diﬀerent versions of software (e.g., standard or professional)
oﬀered by software manufacturers. Typically, a ﬁrm’s decision to oﬀer a
product line is viewed as unexceptional. In some circumstances, however,
there are calls for public policy to limit the range of products oﬀered. At the
time we write this paper, for example, there is an intense debate taking place
in the halls of Congress regarding “network neutrality” regulation. One of
the central issues in this debate is whether providers of “last mile” Internet
access services (typically a local telephone company oﬀering dsl service, a
cable company oﬀering cable modem service, or a wireless service such as
3G) should be allowed to oﬀer more than one grade of service.1 Proponents
of regulation argue that oﬀering multiple grades is unfair and results in some
consumers’ being provided unduly low-quality service.2 For instance, Sena-
tor Olympia Snowe warned that, absent regulation, “Consumers will have all
the selections of a former Soviet Union supermarket. We are going to create
a two-tier Internet, for the haves who can pay the price, and the have nots
who will be relegated to the Internet dirt road.”3
In this paper, we examine the eﬀects of product-line restrictions in mar-
kets where, absent any restrictions, any given supplier could oﬀer a continuum
of vertically diﬀerentiated variants. Our results suggest that product-line re-
1The term “network neutrality” means many things to many people. Other policies
referred to by this term include prohibition of vertical foreclosure, a ban on third-degree
price discrimination (e.g., setting Internet access prices that vary with the identity of the
application provider), and prohibition of two-sided pricing of platform services.
2This type of concern arises in other sectors of the economy as well. For example, a
somewhat similar set of issues arise with respect to supermarkets and the quality of shelf
space that they provide to diﬀerent vendors; the sale of preferential product locations has
been controversial. Turning to publicly provided goods, there is typically strong resistance
to having premium lanes on toll bridges or highways that allow travel in a less congested
lane in return for payment of a fee. Ironically, Air France has complained about plans by
the Marseilles airport to oﬀer lower-price, lower-quality terminal services to other airlines.
(John Lichﬁeld and Jen Wainwright, “France takes cheap ﬂights to the next level with
launch of budget airport in Marseilles,” The Independent, 26 October 2006, at 18.)
3Ira Teinowitz, “Senate Panel Kills ‘Net Neutrality’ Proposal: Web Access Providers
Free to Charge More for Better Service,” TVWeek.com, June 28, 2006, available at
http://www.tvweek.com/news.cms?newsId=10287, site visited July 24, 2006.Hermalin & Katz Introduction 2
strictions aﬀect welfare through several mechanisms and that the eﬀects are
often negative.
Most of our analysis concerns a monopoly supplier. Other authors have
previously examined a monopolist’s choice of product quality. Spence (1975)
showed that a single-product monopolist may choose a quality level higher
or lower than the eﬃcient level, depending on certain properties of consumer
demand. Mussa and Rosen (1978) conducted a classic analysis of a multi-
product monopolist showing that the monopolist generally distorts the set
of products oﬀered to consumers. The present model extends these earlier
analyses by comparing the single-product with the multi-product equilibrium
and by examining the qualities of the oﬀerings of a platform service that
brings two sides of a market together.
We introduce the model in Section 2. In order to shed light on the network
neutrality debate, we examine situations corresponding both to traditional
markets and to what have come to be known as two-sided markets.4 Speciﬁ-
cally, we examine a platform provider that oﬀers services that connect appli-
cations providers with households. For example, the platform provider may
be an Internet service provider (isp) selling services that connect households
with Internet application providers, such as Google or a newspaper’s pro-
prietary web site. We explicitly model the platform provider’s simultaneous
choices of how to price to households and to application providers.
In Section 3, we compare the levels of proﬁts, consumer surplus, and total
surplus when a monopoly platform provider can oﬀer a full range of service
qualities with the corresponding levels when the monopolist can oﬀer only
one product. We examine situations in which applications providers have
heterogeneous demands for the qualities of their connections to households.
We ﬁnd that, as a result of the single-product restriction: (a) application
providers who would otherwise have purchased low-quality connections are
excluded from the market; (b) application providers “in the middle” of the
market purchase connection of higher and more eﬃcient qualities; and (c) ap-
plication providers at the top of the market purchase connections of lower and
less eﬃcient qualities. Eﬀects (a) and (c) reduce total surplus, while eﬀect
(b) raises it. Although we ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects frequently dominate,
there are situations in which restricting a monopolist raises welfare. That
said, it should be observed that application providers at the bottom of the
market—the ones that single-product restrictions typically are intended to
4In our formal model below, σ = 0 corresponds to a one-sided market.Hermalin & Katz The Model 3
aid—are almost always harmed by the restriction.5 Moreover, the restriction
reduces the set of applications available to households.
In Section 4, we consider several extensions of our baseline model. The
most important is to allow for platform competition. The network neutrality
debate, for example, concerns the regulation of cable and telephone compa-
nies that often are local duopolists in the provision of broadband, wireline
Internet access services. We examine the eﬀects of product-line restrictions
in a Hotelling duopoly. Our principal technical ﬁnding is that the equilibrium
quality schedules oﬀered by the duopolists are analogous to the schedule of-
fered by a platform monopoly. The central policy implication of this ﬁnding is
that the welfare results obtained in the monopoly case carry over to this one.
Speciﬁcally, a single-product restriction excludes application providers at the
bottom of the market, has mixed eﬀects on application providers higher up
in the quality spectrum, and typically—but not necessarily—lowers overall
welfare.
The paper closes with a brief conclusion. Proofs not given in the text
may be found in Appendix A.
2 The Model
We begin by considering a monopoly platform that provides an interme-
diation service that facilitates exchange between application providers and
households. We consider a monopoly platform for two reasons. First, the
lack of competition simpliﬁes the analysis and allows us to identify forces
that are also at work in settings with imperfect competition. Second, some
proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that market power lies at
the heart of the problem. Thus, this is a useful setting to examine in its own
right.
The platform charges a hookup fee of h to households and p(q)t oa n
application provider purchasing connection quality q. Under some public
policies, the platform can oﬀer diﬀerent connection qualities (e.g., an isp can
oﬀer diﬀerent combinations of bandwidth, latency, and packet loss rate) to
diﬀerent application providers. As a convention, we use q = 0 to indicate
that an application provider has not connected to the platform.
5Interestingly, this point is implicit in Walras’s (1897)[1980] discussion of the diﬀerent




Figure 1: Fee-for-service model. Solid lines indicate service ﬂows (e.g., Internet
connections). Dotted curves indicate payments.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two relevant market structures, which diﬀer in
terms of the economic relationship between application providers and house-
holds. In the ﬁrst market structure—the fee-for-service model—a household
pays a transaction fee t to the application provider for each use. In the sec-
ond market structure—the advertiser-supported-content model—application
providers earn revenues solely from the sale of advertising and oﬀer their
applications to households at no charge.
There is a continuum of potential application providers providers, which
we normalize to have unit mass. Each application provider has type, θ ∈
[0, ¯ θ] ≡ Θ, where households value the content from high-θ providers more
than from low-θ providers ceteris paribus.L e t F(·) denote the cumulative
distribution function for types, which has a continuous density f(·) such that
0 <f(θ) < ∞ for all θ ∈ [0, ¯ θ].6 The last assumptions ensure that the inverse
hazard rate exists for all θ and is bounded away from 0 for all θ<¯ θ.E a c h
application provider knows its type, while the platform provider knows only
the population distribution of application types.
Technology is such that the platform cannot provide quality of service
less than some minimum level q
¯
,w h e r eq
¯
> 0.7 Denote the platform’s choice
space for quality by
Q≡{ 0}∪{ q|q ≥ q
¯
}.
The platform incurs a cost of c(q) in providing quality q. We assume c(·)i s







). Given the convexity of c(·), this last assumption implies
that
c(q)
q is increasing in q (i.e., the average cost of quality rises with the
6In Appendix B, we discuss how our results can be extended to discrete type spaces.
7Alternatively, the platform could provide lower-quality service but no application
provider would be willing to use that quality even if it were priced at cost.Hermalin & Katz The Model 5
Application Platform Household Advertisers
p(q) h a
Figure 2: Advertiser-supported-content model. Solid lines indicate service ﬂows
(e.g., Internet connections). Dotted curves indicate payments.
quality level). Lastly, in keeping with our notational convention that q =0
corresponds to non-consumption, c(0) = 0.
There is a unit mass of households with identical preferences. Let u( x
θq)
denote the marginal utility derived from consumption of the xth unit of a
type-θ application with connection quality q. We assume that u(·)i sc o n t i n u -
ous and decreasing (i.e., there is diminishing marginal utility from consuming
the content of any speciﬁc provider) with limx→∞ u(x)x =0 .
A household’s utility from connecting to the platform and consuming the












where q(θ) is the connection quality chosen by a type-θ application provider,
x(θ) is the household’s consumption of each type-θ application, and y is the
number of units of the numeraire good consumed.
The quantity a household purchases from a given application provider at



















Because u(·) is monotonic, it is invertible. Hence, an application provider
faces demand
θqd(t)Hermalin & Katz The Model 6
from each household subscribed to the platform, where d(t) ≡ u−1(t).
The marginal cost of providing an application is a constant, k ≥ 0, com-
mon to all application providers. To ensure that trade is socially desirable,
assume u(0) >k . In the fee-for-service case, we assume that any one applica-
tion provider generates a suﬃciently small proportion of household beneﬁts
that it ignores the eﬀect of its pricing on households’ network connection
decisions.8 Conditional on its choice of quality, each application provider
chooses its price to solve
max
t
θq(t − k)d(t). (1)
Observe that θ and q are irrelevant to the solution of this maximization
problem. For expositional convenience, we assume that u(·) gives rise to
a unique proﬁt-maximizing application price, t∗.9 Observe that the proﬁt-
maximizing price is common to all content providers.
In the advertising-supported-content model, let a>kbe the amount paid
by advertisers to the application provider per unit of demand.10 The proﬁts
of an application provider conditional on q are
θq(a − k)d(0). (2)
Observe that, under either business model, an application provider’s prof-




under the fee-for-service business model and
ρ =( a − k)d(0)
8Were this not the case, the platform would be able to engage in a price squeeze,
whereby application providers would be forced to price at cost in order to induce house-
holds to connect to the network.
An equivalent assumption to the one made in the text would be to have the content
providers set their prices before the platform; this timing, however, seems less realistic
than the one used in the text.
9A suﬃcient condition for this would be that xu (x) be decreasing in x; this condition
entails that d(t) is log-concave, which is suﬃcient for (1) to have a unique solution.
10One can also think of a as advertisers’ expected payment to the content provider given
the click-through rate.Hermalin & Katz The Model 7
under the advertiser-supported-content business model.11 Henceforth, we
will express the gross proﬁts of an application provider of type θ that has
purchased connection quality q as θqρ.
The consumer surplus that a household derives from consumption of an




t d(z)dz. The surplus a household derives from consumption
of a type-θ application whose provider has purchased a connection of quality
q can compactly be expressed as θqσ,w h e r eσ = s(t∗) in the fee-for-service
model and σ = s(0) in the advertising model.
To rule out the uninteresting scenario in which q
¯
is the only eﬃcient
level of quality to oﬀer, assume that (ρ + σ)¯ θ>c  (q
¯
). Given our earlier
assumption that the marginal cost of quality exceeds the average cost at
the lowest feasible quality level, this inequality also implies that some trade
















where q(θ) is the connection quality supplied to type-θ applications.12 Let
qw(·) denote the quality-consumption schedule that maximizes welfare.
Lemma 1 Welfare is maximized by: (i) excluding a type-θ application if
the cost of the lowest quality service exceeds the gross beneﬁt the application
generates (i.e., c(q
¯
) > (ρ + σ)θq
¯
); and (ii) otherwise providing access of




(ρ + σ)θq − c(q).
11There can also be a hybrid business model in which an application collects revenues
from both households and advertisers. If one assumes that advertising does not aﬀect
households’ willingness to pay for an application, the hybrid model is equivalent to the
fee-for-service model with a cost of k − a.
12Observe that this expression does not account for the welfare of advertisers. One
can interpret the model as assuming that advertising is provided in a broader, perfectly
competitive market, such that changes in the quantity of online advertising do not give
rise to changes in advertiser welfare. Alternatively, some of the results below generalize to
situations in which increases in advertising correspond to increases in advertiser welfare.
See, for example, Proposition 4 below.Hermalin & Katz The Model 8
Under the ﬁrst-best outcome, a positive measure of application types are ex-
cluded and a positive measure of types are served.
The proof of Lemma 1 establishes the existence of a marginal type, θ
¯
w,
such that this and all higher types of application provider operate and lower
types shut down. Because the marginal contribution of quality to welfare is
increasing in type, it follows that θ>θ   implies qw(θ) ≥ qw(θ ), with the
inequality being strict if qw(θ) >q
¯
. Recalling our notational convention, set
qw(θ) = 0 for those application types that do not operate.
Now consider the equilibrium behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing platform
provider. The timing of play is as follows.
• The platform sets its price schedule to application providers, p(·), and
hookup fee to households, h.
• Application providers simultaneously choose their connection qualities,
q(θ), and, in the fee-for-service model, their prices to households.
• Households observe the hookup fee, connection qualities, and, in the
fee-for-service model, application prices. Households then choose whether
to connect to the network and their consumption levels of the various
applications.
We assume that the platform quotes its prices to application providers on
a per-household basis. That is, the platform commits to a schedule p(q)t h a t
is prorated by the number of end-users it attracts, so that an application
provider that selects quality q pays the platform provider λp(q), where λ is
the proportion of households that subscribe to the platform.
We make this assumption as a means of approximating the fact that,
in reality, platforms attract new applications and households over time and
that a platform may adjust its price over time as well.13 In our one-shot
(albeit multi-stage) model, having the platform set access prices for applica-
tion providers that were independent of the eventual number of household
subscribers could lead to widely varying equilibrium outcomes as the result
of bootstrapping on diﬀerent expectations. For example, as is well known,
the two-sided nature of the market makes the analysis vulnerable to a degen-
erate equilibrium in which applications choose not to connect to the platform
13For an insightful model of adoption dynamics in a two-sided market, see Caillaud and
Jullien (2003).Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 9
because they anticipate that households will not connect, and—given that
no applications are connected—households indeed choose not to connect.
This degenerate outcome is not an equilibrium in our model; because the
platform’s charge is prorated, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a type-θ
application provider to sign with the platform as long as
max
q∈Q\{0}
ρθq − p(q) ≥ 0.
In equilibrium, the surplus realized by a household from all applications—





Because households are identical, the platform can capture their entire gross
surplus by setting the hookup fee, h, to equal (4). Recalling that there is a
unit mass of households, h is also the platform’s revenues from households-
users. The platform’s proﬁts are




















3 The Eﬀects of a Single-Quality Restriction
In this section, we compare equilibrium with and without a single-quality
restriction.
3.1 The Unrestricted Monopoly Equilibrium
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium when a proﬁt-maximizing monopoly
platform is not subject to legal restrictions on the range of qualities oﬀered.
Standard analysis (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Caillaud and Hermalin,
2000) demonstrates that the proﬁt-maximizing, incentive-compatible, indi-








ρq(τ)dτ . (6)Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 10
Consequently, the provider’s problem is
max
q(θ)∈Q
  ¯ θ
0
 












 ) ≤ q(θ) ∀θ,θ
  such that θ
  <θ, (8)
where (7) follows from (5) and (6), and (8) is necessary and suﬃcient for the
resulting quality schedule to be incentive compatible. Integration by parts
allows us to rewrite (7) as
max
q(θ)∈Q
  ¯ θ
0
 










is the inverse of the hazard rate.14 Let qu(·) denote the solution to (7).





w, that connects (i.e., qu(θ) = 0 for all θ<θ
¯







u); as is well known, the lowest type served enjoys no surplus.
The marginal contribution to proﬁts of an increase in q(θ) is proportional
to





T h ep r e s e n c eo fm(θ) captures the fact that increasing the quality level oﬀered
to type-θ application providers increases the information rents that have to be
given to all higher types to keep them from purchasing the quality intended
for type-θ providers.
Because the quality allocated to the top type cannot aﬀect the information
rent received by any other type (m(¯ θ) = 0), the monopolist has no incentive
to distort the quality allocated the top type away from its eﬃcient level; as
is well known, qu(¯ θ)=qw(¯ θ).
Next, consider application types at the bottom of the distribution. Con-
sider the eﬀects of lowering the lowest application type served by an inﬁn-
itesimal amount. The revenues collected from the incremental application
providers and through the increase in the hookup fee charged to households
14We use m as a mnemonic because the inverse hazard rate is also known as the Mills
ratio.Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 11
are just equal to the social beneﬁts. However, the information rents of higher
application types rise. Hence, the platform’s incremental proﬁts are less than
the social beneﬁts. Combined with Lemma 1, this logic establishes:
Lemma 2 The unrestricted platform excludes more application provider
types than is socially optimal. Speciﬁcally, there exists an application type,
θ
¯




u < ¯ θ and qu(θ)=0for all θ<θ
¯
u.
Total surplus under the unrestricted equilibrium is
Wu ≡











3.2 The Restricted Monopoly Equilibrium
Now suppose the platform is restricted to oﬀering only a single level of quality,
and let qr denote the monopolist’s choice.
Clearly, it would be suboptimal for the monopolist to charge a price, pr,
such that pr >ρ ¯ θqr or pr ≤ 0. It also could never maximize proﬁts to oﬀer a
price and quality such that all types of application providers earned positive
surplus. Instead, the monopolist chooses a price and quality such that there
is a marginal application provider type just indiﬀerent between connecting
and not. Rather than view the monopolist’s problem as one of choosing
an optimal quality and price, we can view it as one of choosing an optimal
cutoﬀ type and quality. Note the cutoﬀ type satisﬁes θ =
pr
ρq. Writing the
platform’s problem in this manner, we have
max
{θ∈Θ,q∈Q}
  ¯ θ
θ
 
ρθq + στq − c(q)
 
f(τ)dτ . (11)






q − c(q), (12)
where Λ(θ) is the expected value of a content provider’s type conditional
on that type not being less than θ.L e t θ
¯
r be the marginal type (i.e., the
solution to (11)).Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 12
Proposition 1 A proﬁt-maximizing platform restricted to oﬀering a single
product quality excludes more application providers than would a welfare max-




r). Moreover, the proﬁt-maximizing platform
chooses a quality level that is lower than the one that would maximize total
surplus conditional on the types of application providers that connect to the
platform.
For the case of traditional, one-sided markets, Spence (1975) showed that
the fundamental source of distortions in a single-product ﬁrm’s choice of
quality is that prices and proﬁts are driven by the marginal buyer’s valuation
of quality, while welfare depends on the average buyer’s valuation of quality.
In a two-sided market, one must consider the eﬀects of an incremental quality
increase on the willingness of both sides to pay. Because all households are
identical in our model, the marginal and average valuations of quality are the
same. The distortion arises on the application provider side of the market—
the marginal application provider values increased connection quality by less
than do the inframarginal application providers.
3.3 Comparison of the Equilibria
We now compare the equilibrium in which the monopolist is restricted to
a single product to the equilibrium in which the platform is free to oﬀer a
full product line. One consequence of imposing a single-product restriction
is that low-value application providers can get priced out of the market.
Lemma 3 Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds:
(i) There is a unique solution to the restricted platform’s problem;
(ii) There is a unique solution to the unrestricted platform’s problem;
(iii) If there are multiple solutions to the unrestricted platform’s problem,
then the ﬁrm chooses the one that maximizes the set of application types
served (i.e., that minimizes θ
¯
u);
(iv) It is not a solution to the restricted platform’s problem to set quality
equal to the minimum feasible quality (i.e., qr >q
¯
);
(v) The hazard rate associated with the distribution over application types
is everywhere non-decreasing.Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 13
Then a single-product restriction weakly reduces the set of application types





Contrary to the wishes of network neutrality proponents, regulation may
move the equilibrium outcome closer to “a former Soviet Union supermarket”
rather than away from it.
Lemma 3 leaves open the possibility that, if there are multiple equilibria
absent the single-product restriction and there are multiple equilibria with
the single-product restriction, including one in which the platform provider
oﬀers only the lowest technically feasible quality, and the hazard rate is
decreasing on at least one interval, then the lowest application type served in
some of the restricted equilibria may be lower than the lowest type served in
some—but not all—of the unrestricted equilibria. Given the highly restrictive
set of conditions this case would have to satisfy, we strongly doubt that this
possibility is of empirical importance.
Lemma 3 also leaves open the possibility that the lowest application type
served would be unaﬀected by the single-product restriction. As we now
show, this can happen only if the restricted platform would maximize its
proﬁts by oﬀering the lowest technologically feasible quality. This seems an
unlikely scenario in many markets and is certainly not the scenario envisioned
by proponents of network neutrality, who worry that applications with low
types will receive worse service (“the Internet dirt road”) absent network
neutrality.
Proposition 2 If the restricted platform does not oﬀer the product with
the lowest technically feasible quality level, then a single-product restriction
strictly reduces the set of applications oﬀered to households in comparison
with the unrestricted equilibrium.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. When the unre-
stricted platform connects additional application types at the bottom of the
market, it must lower the prices charged to higher-type application providers,
but it does not have to distort higher types’ quality levels further. When
the restricted platform serves additional application types at the bottom of
the market, it does so by lowering both the price and the quality level con-
sumed by all types connecting to the platform. The change in quality is a
15This proposition also holds for a discrete type space.Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 14
costly distortion that aﬀects the revenues collected from both applications
providers and households.
Restricting the platform to oﬀering a single quality level results in some
applications’ purchasing lower quality connections than they would have pur-
chased if platform were unrestricted. One response could be to require the
platform to oﬀer only the highest level oﬀered prior to imposition of regu-
lation.16 Recall that the highest quality product oﬀered by the unrestricted
platform is the quality that is eﬃcient for the most valuable application,
qw(¯ θ).
Proposition 3 Consider a policy that requires the platform to oﬀer only the
highest quality variant that would be oﬀered absent regulation. In equilibrium,
strictly fewer application providers connect to the platform than under either
of the following policies: (a) the platform is allowed to oﬀer at most one
quality level but can choose any technologically feasible quality level, and (b)
the platform is free to oﬀer a full range of qualities.
In other words, a policy that mandates the highest service quality reduces
the set of applications available to households.
Now, return to consideration of a single-product restriction that grants
the platform the freedom to choose the quality. As Proposition 2 shows, a
likely consequence of this restriction would be greater exclusion of low-value
applications in comparison with the unrestricted equilibrium. Consider the
applications that are excluded under the single-product restriction, but that
would have been provided under the unrestricted equilibrium. These ap-
plications, with the possible exception of the lowest type, would generate
provider proﬁts plus household surplus strictly greater than the platform’s
costs of transmitting the content. Hence, the increased exclusion is a reduc-
tion in total surplus ceteris paribus. We refer to this as the exclusion eﬀect
of a single-product restriction.
There are two other eﬀects of a single-product restriction. One is that
the connection quality for the highest-type application falls from qw(¯ θ)t oqr.
It follows that there is a positive measure of application types that enjoy less
eﬃcient quality in the sense that





16We are assuming here that regulation is unanticipated, so that the service provider did
not strategically reduce the highest quality oﬀered prior to the imposition of regulation.Hermalin & Katz Effects of a Single-Quality Restriction 15
We refer to this reduction in welfare as the reduced-quality eﬀect of a single-
product restriction.
On the other hand, the connection quality for some application types
is greater under the single-product restriction than it would be in the un-
restricted equilibrium. In Appendix A (Lemma A.1), we show that there
is one type, ˆ θ ∈ (θ
¯
r, ¯ θ), such that qr = qw(ˆ θ). Because the unrestricted
equilibrium entails a downward distortion in quality for all types except the
top one, qu(ˆ θ) <q w(ˆ θ). By continuity, there must be a positive measure of
types for which quality is more eﬃcient under network neutrality than in the
unrestricted equilibrium. That is,




for a positive measure of types. We refer to this welfare beneﬁt as the
improved-quality eﬀect of a single-product restriction.
In Appendix B, we show by example that the net welfare eﬀects of a
single-product restriction can be positive or negative.17 Despite the overall
ambiguity of the welfare consequence of imposing a product-line restriction,
we can derive a condition that must necessarily hold if the restriction is to
increase welfare (correspondingly, the negation of that condition is a suﬃcient
condition for the unrestricted equilibrium to yield greater welfare). Recall
that qu(θ) = 0 for θ<θ
¯
u. Deﬁne qr(θ)=qr if θ ≥ θ
¯
r and = 0 if θ<θ
¯
r.
Proposition 4 Suppose the connection quality oﬀered when the platform is
subject to a single-product restriction exceeds the lowest technically feasible
quality level (i.e., qr > q). If qr(·) dominates qu(·) in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance, then the single-product restriction lowers welfare.18,19
The condition identiﬁed in the previous result provides the basis of intu-
ition. Because the single-product restriction results in greater exclusion of
17Some of these examples assume a discrete type space. This is done to simplify the
exposition. A more general analysis of the discrete-type case is presented in Appendix B.





0 qu(τ)dτ for all x in the common domain. Because neither qr(·)n o r
qu(·) is a distribution, it would arguably be more appropriate to describe the condition in
terms of weak majorization (Peˇ cari´ c et al., 1992, §12.1). We use the language of stochastic
dominance because it is more common in economics.
19This result can readily be extended to allow for advertiser welfare. Speciﬁcally, as long
as an advertiser’s welfare is increasing in the volume of advertising, Propositions 2 and 4
imply welfare, including advertisers’ welfare, is reduced by a single-product restriction.Hermalin & Katz Extensions 16











r]. Because qu(¯ θ)=qw(¯ θ) >q r, it follows that, if it is not to be






for all θ,t h e nqr must be considerably larger than qu(θ
¯
r). In other words, for
the single-product restriction to raise welfare, the marginal application type
served under the restricted equilibrium must obtain a connection of much
higher quality than the the connection it would obtain absent the restriction.
We next make an observation about the political economy of single-
product restrictions, such as those advocated by some proponents of network
neutrality regulation. We show by example in Appendix B (Example 2) that
there exist situations in which application providers favor network neutral-
ity, the platform (e.g., an ISP) opposes it, and imposition of the restriction
would reduce overall welfare. It should be emphasized, however, that there
are also examples in which a single-product restriction reduces application
providers’ aggregate surplus (Appendix B, Example 3).
4 Extensions
We next extend the basic model to consider alternative cost assumptions,
technological restrictions on quality choice, and competitive platforms.
4.1 Alternative Cost Assumptions
In this subsection, we brieﬂy discuss three extensions with respect to our
modeling of costs. First, our model assumes that there are no product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed costs. In the presence of ﬁxed costs, variety is costly as well
as potentially beneﬁcial. For one-sided markets, Katz (1980) has shown
that, in the presence of such ﬁxed costs, a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist may
oﬀer more or fewer than the total-surplus-maximizing number of products
(quality levels). Depending on the structure of household and application
provider preferences, similar eﬀects arise in a two-sided market. Thus, inHermalin & Katz Extensions 17
some cases, restricting the number of products oﬀered by the monopolist
would exacerbate the distortion, and in other cases, it would ameliorate it.
Second, we have assumed that there are no economies of scale in produc-
tion. Hence, marginal-cost pricing would allow a platform to cover its costs.
The presence of economies of scale can give rise to an additional social beneﬁt
of allowing the platform to oﬀer a variety of qualities: a multi-product ﬁrm
has a greater ability to cover its costs. Moreover, in a model that required
a large, ﬁxed investment in facilities, an unrestricted platform would have
greater investment incentives than would a restricted platform.
Third, we have assumed that unit costs rise with quality. Some partic-
ipants in the network neutrality debate have argued that increased quality
is essentially costless, at least up to some point. We doubt the empirical
validity of this claim, but it is nonetheless of interest to examine the case in
which c(q) ≡ c for all q not exceeding some maximum possible quantity, ¯ q.
Observe that, when c(q) ≡ c, there is no social beneﬁt of variety in
the following sense. Under the ﬁrst-best outcome, all content that is worth
transmitting (i.e., such that (ρ + σ)θ ≥ c) is transmitted at the highest
possible quality, ¯ q. Now, consider the proﬁt-maximizing outcomes. Recall
that the marginal contribution to the unrestricted platform’s proﬁts of an




above). It can be seen by inspection that the platform’s problem of picking
a quality has a bang-bang solution when c (θ)=0 :at y p e - θ application is
either connected at quality ¯ q (if (ρ + σ)θ>ρ m (θ)) or is excluded from the
market (if (ρ + σ)θ<ρ m (θ)). Given that the platform oﬀers only a single
quality level absent any restriction, imposing a net-neutrality restriction has
no eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome.
Summarizing this analysis,
Proposition 5 Suppose c(q) ≡ c for all q ∈ [q
¯
, ¯ q]. Then a single-product
restriction has no eﬀect on the set of equilibrium outcomes.
It should be noted that this result depends on the functional form we have
assumed for user beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, let v(q,θ) denote the gross beneﬁts
enjoyed by a type-θ application provider that connects at quality q.T h e
standard screening condition requires that vqθ(q,θ) > 0 (where subscripts
here indicate partial derivatives). Our functional form imposes the stronger
condition that vqθ(q,θ) is a positive constant. When this cross partial can
vary with q, there are cases in which the unrestricted platform would oﬀerHermalin & Katz Extensions 18
quality variety even though there is no marginal cost of higher quality. Al-
though there is no social value to variety, the platform would oﬀer a product
line as a screening device (i.e., as a form of second-degree price discrimina-
tion). Relative to the ﬁrst best, this is a privately proﬁtable action that is
socially wasteful (some content is transmitted via an ineﬃciently low quality
connection).20
Even with a more general v(q,θ) function, a platform restricted to oﬀering
a single quality would oﬀer the eﬃcient quality level, ¯ q. It does not follow,
however, that the restriction would raise welfare. One would also have to
check whether the restricted platform would serve more or fewer application
providers than would the unrestricted platform. In the context of a one-sided
market with two possible quality levels, for example, Deneckere and McAfee
(1996) show that this type of price discrimination can result in a Pareto
improvement in consumer welfare.
The welfare eﬀects in a general model of a two-sided market remain a
question for future research. Observe that—because the connection quality
provided under a single-product restriction is eﬃcient, but those utilized
when a variety of qualities are oﬀered are not—a suﬃcient condition for the
restriction to raise welfare is that it not reduce the range of applications
oﬀered to households in equilibrium. The contrapositive of this result is that
a necessary condition for the platform’s oﬀering a variety of qualities to raise
total surplus is that it lead to more applications’ being oﬀered.
This ﬁnding parallels the well-known result that a necessary condition
for third-degree price discrimination to raise welfare is that total output
rise under discrimination.21 There are, however, important diﬀerences be-
tween the eﬀects of quality variety (or second-degree price discrimination)
and third-degree discrimination. First, a simple measure of total applica-
tions lacks economic meaning when applications are heterogeneous and are
delivered via connections of varying qualities. Second, the distributions of
the welfare eﬀects across market segments are somewhat diﬀerent. In the
case of third-degree price discrimination, discrimination lowers eﬃciency in
high-value markets (prices rise), raises eﬃciency in low-value markets (prices
fall), and has ambiguous eﬀects in middle-value markets. In contrast, “dis-
crimination” in the form of a product line increases eﬃciency at both the
20In the presence of economies of scale, however, second-best (Ramsey) pricing could
entail the use of a product line even when quality were otherwise free.
21See, e.g., Varian (1985) and references therein.Hermalin & Katz Extensions 19
high and low ends of the market, and eﬃciency losses occur in the middle.
4.2 Technologically Restricted Quality levels
Heretofore, we have allowed the producer to choose the quality level from a
continuum of possibilities. In this section, we assume that there are only two
technologically feasible quality levels, high (h)a n dl o w(  ). This assump-
tion is motivated by the fact that often quality levels (e.g., bandwidth and
latency) are limited and, in part, determined by forces beyond a platform’s
control (e.g., capabilities of routers and computers or the installed base of
complementary products).22
Let c>0 be the cost of providing a unit of the high-quality good. For
convenience, we set the cost of providing a unit of the low-quality good to 0.
So that there is a welfare beneﬁt to high quality, we assume (ρ+σ)¯ θh−c>
(ρ + σ)¯ θ . Observe that there is also a welfare beneﬁt from oﬀering the low-
quality product (i.e., (ρ + σ)θh − c<(ρ + σ)θ  for θ suﬃciently close to
zero).
At prices ph and p ,at y p e - θ content provider is indiﬀerent between the
two qualities if and only if
ρhθ − ph = ρ θ − p  .
Solving this expression for θ and noting that the left-hand side increases
faster in θ than the right-hand side, we can conclude that all types such that
θ ≥
ph − p 
ρ(h −  )
prefer high to low quality. If the ratio on the right-hand side exceeds ¯ θ,t h e n
there is no demand for the high-quality product.
An application provider prefers low quality to not connecting at all if and
only if
ρ θ − p  ≥ 0.
Provided
ph − f 





22In practice, a continuum of quality levels may be feasible, but it may be eﬃcient to
oﬀer only a ﬁnite, discrete set.Hermalin & Katz Extensions 20
we have




no connection, if θ<
p 
ρ 
  quality, if
p 





ρ(h− ) ≤ θ
. (14)
We ﬁrst characterize the unrestricted equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Suppose only two quality levels are technologically feasible and
the distribution of application types has a non-decreasing hazard rate. An
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ph − p 
ρ(h −  )
 
. (15)
It follows from this result that the marginal application types purchasing
















Welfare absent regulation is
  θh
θ 
(ρ + σ) θf(θ)dθ +
  ¯ θ
θh
 
(ρ + σ)θh− c
 
f(θ)dθ. (18)
The derivative of this expression with respect to θh is
 
c − (ρ + σ)θh(h −  )
 
f(θh).
By (17), this last expression is equal to −ρm(θh)(h− )f(θh) < 0. Hence, wel-
fare would rise if the platform lowered θh while holding θ  constant. In otherHermalin & Katz Extensions 21
words, conditional on the set of active application providers, the platform
transmits too little content via the high-quality connection.
Now, suppose that regulation forces the platform to oﬀer at most one















where c(h)=c and c( )=0 .
Lemma 5 Suppose that only two quality levels are technologically feasible
and the distribution of application types has a non-decreasing hazard rate.
If the monopolist oﬀers a single product of quality qr, then it maximizes its











The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4 and is omitted.














When qr =  , this expression is identical to (16). Thus, if regulation induces
the platform to provide only low-quality service, then the restriction has no
eﬀect on the set of applications served in equilibrium. However, the restric-
tion reduces the amount of content transmitted via high-quality connections
to zero from a level that itself would have been too low absent the restriction.
We can thus conclude:
Proposition 6 Suppose that only two quality levels are technologically feasi-
ble and the distribution of application types has a non-decreasing hazard rate.
If the platform chooses low quality service under a single-product restriction,
then that restriction lowers total surplus.
Lastly, suppose that the restricted platform oﬀers only high-quality ser-
vice. We have found numerous examples (e.g., application types are uni-
formly distributed) in which this restriction lowers total surplus relative to
the unrestricted equilibrium, but we have been unable to construct an ex-
ample in which it raises total surplus. That said, we have also been unable
to construct a proof that such an example does not exist.Hermalin & Katz Extensions 22
4.3 Oligopoly
We now examine a market in which two platforms (e.g., a local telephone
company oﬀering dsl service and a cable company oﬀering cable modem
service) compete to serve households and applications providers.
We model the platforms as competing ` al aHotelling. Variants of the
Hotelling model have been used by several previous authors to examine com-
petition between single-product platforms.23 Examples include Anderson and
Coate (2005), Armstrong (in press), Gabszewicz et al. (2002), and Rochet
and Tirole (2003).24
There are two platforms, located on the unit interval. Platform i is located
at point i on the line, where i =0 ,1. The timing of play in the duopoly game
is as follows.
• The platforms simultaneously set their price schedules to application
providers, pi(·), and hookup fees to households, hi, i =0 ,1. As in
the monopoly model, pi(·) is the price per household that platform i
charges an application provider for access to the platform’s household
subscriber base.
• Application providers simultaneously choose their connection qualities
on the two platforms, qi(θ), and, in the fee-for-service model, their
prices to households.
• Households observe the hookup fees, connection qualities, and, in the
fee-for-service model, application prices. Households then choose, for
23There have also been many insightful papers examining quality competition in one-
sided markets, with several focusing on the issue of whether suppliers will choose to com-
pete head to head or oﬀer diﬀerent products than one another to avoid direct competition.
For single-product suppliers, Hotelling (1929) found that minimum diﬀerentiation would
result as each ﬁrm staked out the middle of the famous Hotelling line. Shaked and Sut-
ton (1982), however, analyzed a multi-stage game in which single-product ﬁrms choose
to diﬀerentiate themselves in the ﬁrst stage (i.e., choose product locations that are not
near one another) in order to relax second-stage price competition. Brander and Eaton
(1984), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), and others have extended this analysis to multi-
product ﬁrms. However, DeFraja (1996) ﬁnds that suppliers oﬀer identical product lines in
a single-stage game with competition in quantities and vertically diﬀerentiated products.
As we will demonstrate below, the platforms in our model compete head to head in any
equilibrium in which households do not multi-home.
24For a survey of research on two-sided markets, see Rochet and Tirole (in press).Hermalin & Katz Extensions 23
each platform, whether to connect to it and their consumption levels
of the various applications.
We assume households are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line.
A household incurs “transportation costs” equal to T times the distance
between the household and a platform to which it subscribes. By analogy to
equation (4), the surplus gross of transportation costs derived by a household




θqi(θ)f(θ)dθ − hi .
A household at location L prefers platform 0 to platform 1 if and only if
S0 − TL>S 1 − T(1 − L). (21)
If the right-hand side of (21) is positive, then location L is a contested house-
hold. More generally if there are households for whom either platform would
provide positive net surplus (including transportation cost), we say there are
contested households. If each household can obtain positive surplus from at
most one platform, we say there are no contested households.25
Up to this point, we ignored the cost incurred by the platform to connect
a household because that cost was irrelevant provided that it was not so
great that hooking-up a household to the network would yield negative sur-
plus. The hookup cost, denoted K, is now relevant because it aﬀects whether
households wish to single-home (connect to at most one platform) or multi-
home (connect to both platforms). For the time-being, we will analyze the
market under the assumption that household multi-homing is infeasible. Be-
low, however, we will establish a condition on K such that no household
multi-homes in equilibrium even when it is otherwise feasible to do so.
Recall that platforms’ prices to application providers are quoted on a
prorated basis; hence, when households single-home, it is a weakly domi-




ρθq − pi(q) ≥ 0,
25We use the contested/not contested distinction rather than the covered/uncovered
distinction common to the literature because, for a range of parameter values, a market
can be covered—all customers are served—without either ﬁrm’s setting a price that would
attract its rival’s customers if the rival were to raise its price.
26We do not allow a platform to require applications to sign exclusive-dealing contracts.
To date, isps have not demanded exclusivity for most applications.Hermalin & Katz Extensions 24
where Qi is the range of qualities oﬀered by platform i.
Let Di(S0,S 1) denote the number of households that prefer platform i








2T ,j = i, if there exist contested households
.
Platform provider i’s problem is to choose hi and qi(·) to maximize proﬁts.
One can equivalently think of a platform having a choice of both quality

















Observe that, conditional on the value of Si, a duopoly platform’s opti-
mization problem with respect to qi(·) is identical to the monopolist’s (i.e.,
expression (7) in the unrestricted case and expression (11) in the restricted
case). We have shown,
Lemma 6 Consider a Hotelling market in which household multi-homing is
infeasible. The quality schedule oﬀered by each duopoly platform in equilib-
rium is the same as the schedule oﬀered by the platform in the monopoly
model of Section 3.
This result is a manifestation of what has come to be known as the “ter-
minating access problem.”27 Although there are competing platforms, an
application provider has only one way to connect with a given household
that has chosen a particular platform. There is a sense in which, from the
application providers’ perspective, that platform has a monopoly over access
to that household. The result is also a consequence of the fact that the degree
of market power a platform has with respect to single-homing households is

















27For a regulatory body’s expression of concern with this problem, see Federal Commu-
nications Commission (2001), paragraphs 13 and 14. For an early analysis of the problem,
see Doyle and Smith (1998).Hermalin & Katz Extensions 25
where z = u or r depending on regulatory regime. We can rewrite (22) as
πi =( Π
M − K − Si)Di(S0,S 1). (23)
Observe, from (23), that the market exists only if the hookup cost is less
than the monopoly proﬁt per customer (i.e., ΠM ≥ K), a condition we have
been assuming implicitly and, now, assume explicitly.
We can now establish the following.
Lemma 7 The Hotelling duopoly model in which household multi-homing is
infeasible has a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. Each platform oﬀers
the same quality schedule and price schedule to the application providers as
would the monopolist in the model of Section 3 when subject to the same
regulatory regime. Moreover, hookup fees are as follows:


















(ii) If ΠM − K ≥ T>2









3(ΠM − K) ≥ T ≥ 0,t h e n














Observe that we can view the platform’s marginal cost of signing up
a household as the hookup cost minus the proﬁts the platform earns from















In this light, (24) is just the usual result that a monopolist facing linear
demand with price intercept ¯ P charges price 1
2( ¯ P +C), where C is marginal
cost. Similarly, (26) is the standard result for Hotelling models with contestedHermalin & Katz Extensions 26
consumers in which the equilibrium price is transportation cost plus marginal
cost. Observe, too, from (26) that, as T ↓ 0, the equilibrium approaches the
Bertrand equilibrium in which ﬁrms price at marginal cost. Absent platform
diﬀerentiation, Bertrand competition forces the platforms to bid away the
proﬁts they make from the application providers in their eﬀorts to entice
households to sign with their platform.
We now return to the question of multi-homing. Suppose
K ≥ max
q(θ)






















The right-hand side of expression (27) is the maximum proﬁt an unre-
stricted monopoly platform can earn from trade with application providers
on a per-household basis. If expression (27) didn’t hold, then it would be
possible for a platform to charge households negative hookup fees and still
earn a positive proﬁt. As we see no evidence of platforms engaging in such ex-
treme subsidization of households, we view (27) as a reasonable assumption.
Given this assumption we can establish the following result.
Lemma 8 Suppose that the platforms’ choices of product lines are unre-
stricted, condition (27) holds, and application providers believe that no house-
hold will multi-home regardless of the platforms’ play. Then the equilibrium
identiﬁed in Lemma 7 is also an equilibrium when household multi-homing is
feasible.
Next, suppose the public policy limits each platform to oﬀering a single
product quality.
Lemma 9 Suppose that each platform is restricted to oﬀering a single qual-
ity, application providers believe that no household will multi-home regardless






ρθq + σθq − c(q)
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ρθq + σθ{q − qr}−c(q)
 
f(τ)dτ < K . (29)
Then the equilibrium identiﬁed in Lemma 7 is also an equilibrium when
household multi-homing is feasible.
The two inequalities stated in the lemma guarantee that there is no quality
level and set of application providers served such that the incremental surplus
created by multi-homing is greater than or equal to the cost of a household’s
second network connection. Hence, there is no proﬁtable deviation that will
induce multi-homing.
Because welfare is determined by the quality schedule, Lemmas 6 through
9 establish conditions under which all of our earlier welfare results apply to
the case of competing platforms:
Proposition 7 Suppose that conditions (27) through (29) hold and appli-
cation providers believe that no household will multi-home regardless of the
platforms’ play. Then the welfare consequences of imposing a single-product
restriction on Hotelling duopolists are identical to the consequences of apply-
ing such a restriction to a monopoly platform.
We close our discussion of platform competition and product-line restric-
tions by noting that, in some circumstances when the conditions of Lemma 9
are not satisﬁed, households may multi-home in equilibrium. Household
multi-homing can arise because a single-product restriction creates an arti-
ﬁcial value of platform variety. It is artiﬁcial because—absent regulation—a
single platform would have the ability to oﬀer a full range of qualities. We
observe that, in addition to ineﬃciently doubling expenditures on network
connections when it induces household multi-homing, a public policy that
forces any given ﬁrm to oﬀer at most one quality level may not result in all
households or applications consuming the same quality of service—suppliers
can collectively oﬀer a range of products even if each platform oﬀers only
one.
5 Conclusion
We have formally modeled the eﬀects of product-line restrictions such as
those sought by some proponents of network neutrality regulation. We exam-Hermalin & Katz Conclusion 28
ined a two-sided market for platform services in which application providers
on one side of the market purchase platform services of varying qualities that
allow the applications to be provided to the households that subscribe to the
relevant platform.
For both a monopoly platform and Hotelling duopolists, we found that
a single-product restriction results in: (a) application providers that would
otherwise have purchased a low-quality variant being excluded from the mar-
ket; (b) applications “in the middle” of the market purchasing a higher and
more eﬃcient quality; and (c) applications at the top of the market purchas-
ing a lower and less eﬃcient quality. We ﬁnd that the net welfare eﬀects
can be positive or negative, although the analysis suggests to us that harm
is the more likely outcome. Moreover, applications at the bottom of the
market—the ones that a single-product restriction is typically intended to
aid—are almost always harmed by the restriction, and consumers have fewer
applications available to them as a consequence.28
In summary, although our speciﬁc ﬁndings must be regarded as tenta-
tive given the exploratory nature of our model, we believe that our analysis
urges caution. A rigorous case for network neutrality regulation entailing
product-line restictions has not been made, and there are sound reasons to
expect such policies to harm consumers and economic eﬃciency. Moreover,
there are additional eﬀects that would need to be considered in a full policy
assessment. For instance, a single-product restriction will generally reduce
the platform’s provider’s proﬁts and, consequently, might adversely aﬀect the
platform provider’s investment incentives.
We close by noting that this type of analysis could be extended to other
elements of proposed network neutrality regulation, including the proposal
that providers of last-mile Internet access services be allowed to charge house-
holds but not applications providers. It is readily shown that—because all
28In an earlier version of this paper, we examined a model of Cournot competition
between undiﬀerentiated duopolists in a one-sided market in which each ﬁrm could either
oﬀer two quality levels or was restricted to oﬀering only one. In that model, imposition of
a single-product restriction always reduces welfare. Absent the restriction, the two ﬁrms
engage in head-to-head competition across full product lines, a result ﬁrst obtained by
DeFraja (1996). In some circumstances, the single-product restriction induces the two
ﬁrms to oﬀer identical products. The resulting loss of variety reduces welfare. In other
circumstances, a restriction on the number of products that each ﬁrm is allowed to oﬀer
induces the ﬁrms oﬀer non-overlapping, or vertically diﬀerentiated, products. Here, the
resulting loss of competition harms both consumers and economic eﬃciency.Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 29
application providers would utilize the highest available quality level—the
platform would oﬀer application providers only one quality of service. More-
over, because application-provider surplus would be increasing in the service
quality, the monopolist in our model would oﬀer a quality level that would be
lower than either the socially eﬃcient quality level or the quality level that
would be oﬀered if the platform were restricted to oﬀering a single quality
but allowed to charge both sides of the market for access services.29
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Recall that
c(q)





) < 0, (30)
then
(ρ + σ)θq − c(q) < 0,
for all q ≥ q
¯
. Thus, for all feasible q, welfare is greater if these types are






) ≥ 0, (31)
then it is welfare enhancing (at least weakly) to serve these types. Note that
the minimum θ satisfying (31) is the least upper bound of θ satisfying (30).
It follows that there is a marginal type, θ
¯
w, such that θ<θ
¯
w should be
excluded and θ ≥ θ
¯
w should operate. Clearly, θ
¯







w < ¯ θ. Hence, there is a positive measure of types who
should be excluded and a positive measure of types who should be served. If
a type is served, then its contribution to welfare is maximized by choosing q
to maximize
(ρ + σ)θq − c(q)
subject to q ≥ q
¯
.
29The ﬁnding that the quality level would be less than socially optimal builds on the
fact that, in our model, the monopolist is able to appropriate all of the marginal beneﬁts
of quality enjoyed by households.Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 30
Proof of Proposition 1: Utilizing the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order
condition for θ
¯




















w.T h e n
(ρ + σ)θ
¯
rq − c(q) ≤ (ρ + σ)θ
¯
wq − c(q)






) (because c(q)/q is increasing in q)
= 0 (by deﬁnition of θ
¯
w)
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of (32) is positive, and we have just






Conditional on connecting only types θ ≥ θ
¯









r,t h eq that solves that problem must exceed the q that
solves (12).
Proof of Lemma 3: Deﬁne quality q  such that q
¯
≤ q  ≤ min{qu(θ
¯
u),q r}.




u. Consider an extension of the un-
restricted platform’s equilibrium quality oﬀerings in which q(θ)r e m a i n st h e
same for θ ≥ θ
¯




u). By construction, this ex-
tension satisﬁes the order restriction and, thus, it would have been feasible
for the unrestricted platform to have oﬀered it. By (6), this extension is
incentive compatible if and only if the prices charged to all application types
θ ≥ θ
¯




r)q . Because this extended line was not the
line chosen by the unrestricted platform, the change in proﬁts from adopting
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Note this inequality is strict if conditions (ii) or (iii) are satisﬁed.


































































Note this inequality is strict if condition (i) is satisﬁed.








r). Note both Δ and ΔF are

















































The ﬁrst inequality in (36) follows from (33) and the inequality in (37) follows
from (34). The second inequality in (36) follows because q  ≤ qr and c(q)/q is
an increasing function. Observe that (35) and (37) are the same expression,
so this chain of inequalities yields a contradiction if any of the inequalities
are strict. However, as noted, under condition (i), the inequality in (37) is
strict; and, under conditions (ii) or (iii), the ﬁrst inequality in (36) is strict.








,t h e nq  can be chosen so q  <q r. Hence, the second inequality




u if condition (iv) holds.
We now turn to the suﬃciency of condition (v). Note the same revealedHermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 32











  − m(τ)ρq



































(i.e., the unrestricted platform would not strictly prefer to extend down to
θ). Similarly, the same reveal preference argument used to derive (34) applies






















































(i.e., the restricted platform would not strictly prefer to cutoﬀ sales at θ).
Observe (38) implies
(ρ + σ)θq  − c(q )
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≥ (ρ + σ)
 
1 − F(θ)































r). (41)Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 33





r, and hence the left-hand side of (40) is strictly greater than




r), which means the hazard
rate evaluated at θ
¯
u is strictly less than it is evaluated at θ
¯
r, a contradic-




u if condition (v) holds.









u. Select a q  such that q
¯
≤ q  <q r and q  ≤ qu(θ
¯
u). The
same revealed preference arguments used to establish that the unrestricted
platform would not wish to extend downward (i.e., serve types worse than
θ
¯
u) and that the restricted platform would not wish to have a higher cutoﬀ
than θ
¯





u. Making that substitution into (40) and utilitizing the




















r must be false reductio








r,a sw a st ob es h o w n .
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we assemble some facts. Recall that
qw(¯ θ) >q w(θ) for all θ<¯ θ, including θ
¯
r,w h e r eθ
¯
r is the marginal type served
under the ﬁrst policy. By Proposition 1, qr <q w(θ
¯
r). Hence, qr <q w(¯ θ) ≡ ¯ qw.
Let θ
¯










r.L e t θ
¯
R p l a yt h er o l ep l a y e db yθ
¯
r in the proof of Lemma 3 and
let θ
¯
r play the role played by θ
¯
u in that proof. Note, because qr < ¯ qw,t h e
equivalent of condition (iv) holds.








r.T h e n
θ
¯
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But c(q)/q is a strictly increasing function of q. Hence, (42) contradicts the
fact that ¯ qw >q r. The result follows reductio ad absurdum.
The second part of the proposition follows from the ﬁrst coupled with
Lemma 3.
Lemma A.1 There exists an application type, ˆ θ ∈ (θ
¯
r, ¯ θ), such that the
quality under a single-product restriction (i.e., qr) is eﬃcient for that type
(i.e., qr = qw(ˆ θ)).
Proof: Because some trade is always proﬁtable for the platform, θ
¯






r) <ρ¯ θ + σΛ(¯ θ)=ρ¯ θ + σ¯ θ,












r). The result follows because qw(·) is a continuous function.
Proof of Proposition 4: By revealed preference, the platform’s proﬁt
cannot be less absent regulation than under the single-product restriction.Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 35
It follows that a suﬃcient condition for welfare to be greater in the unre-
stricted equilibrium is that application-provider surplus (A)b eg r e a t e ri n
that equilibrium than under regulation.30 Observe
Ar =









































where the second equality in (43) follows from the deﬁnition of integration
and the fact that qr(t) ≡ 0 for t<θ
¯
r, while the second equality in (44)
follows from (6) and the fact that qu(t) ≡ 0 for t<θ
¯
u.I f qr(·) dominates
qu(·) in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, then it follows from




r by Proposition 2 that Au >A r.
Suﬃciency follows. Because the necessary condition is the contrapositive of
the suﬃciency condition, it follows as well.
Proof of Lemma 4: Deﬁne Δf = fh − f  and let Δq = h −  . Consider










Δf + f  − c
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For the moment, we ignore the constraints (i.e., that (13) hold and that both
fractions in (13) be between 0 and ¯ θ). As we will demonstrate, they are not






























30Recall end-users’ surplus is fully captured by the platform so is accounted for in the
platform’s proﬁt.Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 36
If the solution to the unconstrained problem satisﬁes the constraints, then
that solution is also the solution to the constrained problem. The ﬁrst-order






























Because m(·) is non-increasing, it is readily seen that if solutions exist they
must be unique and they satisfy the second-order condition because the deriv-
atives (the left-hand sides of (47) and (48)) are positive to the left of the
optimum and negative to the right of the optimum.
Given the continuity of m(·)a n dt h a tm(0) > 0=m(¯ θ), (47) must have





Because m(·) is non-increasing and c>0, it follows that, if (48) has a







that is, (13) is satisﬁed. Hence, we’re done if we can show that there exists
aΔ f such that
Δf





















= ¯ θ(h −  )(ρ + σ),
which violates the assumption that there is a welfare beneﬁt to high quality.
By contradiction, (48) has a solution.
We have shown that the solutions to (47) and (48) maximize (46) and
satisfy the relevant constraints. Algebra yields (15).Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 37
Proof of Lemma 7: Regardless of which deﬁnition of Di(S0,S 1) applies,
(23) is global concave in Si and, thus, has a unique solution. If, in equilib-
rium, there are no contested households, then Sj, j  = i, is irrelevant to the
optimal Si. Given the symmetry between the platforms and the concavity of
(23), it follows that any equilibrium without contested households must be
symmetric. Suppose there are contested households in equilibrium, then S0

















S0 = S1 =Π
M − K − T. (50)
Hence, we’ve established uniqueness and symmetry.
In a no-contested-households equilibrium, a platform selects S to maxi-
mize
(Π




subject to the constraint that it not “intrude” into the other platform’s mar-










2 , if T>ΠM − K (i.e., (52) doesn’t bind)
T
2 , if T ≤ ΠM − K (i.e., (52) binds)
. (53)
A no-contested-households equilibrium when T ≤ ΠM − K and, thus, S =
T/2 can exist only if the best response to Sj = T/2i sn o tSi >T / 2. Using
(49), this requires
π
M − K − 2S −
T
2
≤ 0 (54)Hermalin & Katz Appendix A: Proofs 38





M − K). (55)
If (55) doesn’t hold, then the equilibrium results in the platforms contesting
for some households, so S is given by (50). Straightforward algebra on ex-
pressions (50) and (53) yield expressions (24)–(26).
Proof of Lemma 8: First, given their beliefs—which are correct if the




ρθq − pi(q) ≥ 0.
Second, we verify that no household would multi-home given the equilib-
rium strategies set forth in Lemma 7. Observe h>0 as a consequence of
(27). It follows, therefore, given the symmetric oﬀerings of the two platforms,
that a household could only lose by multi-homing.
Third, we verify that neither platform would wish to deviate. Without
loss of generality, suppose that network 1 is oﬀering the candidate equilibrium
surplus level and quality schedule, and network 0 deviates. By deﬁnition
of equilibrium in the model when multi-homing is infeasible, there is no
deviation that is both proﬁtable and does not induce any multi-homing.
Hence, to complete the proof, we need only rule out deviations by a platform
that induces at least some multi-homing.
For a household at location L that multi-homes, the incremental surplus






q0(θ) − qu(θ), 0
 
f(θ)dθ − h0 − LT . (56)
A multi-homing household will sign with platform 0 only if that surplus is















f(θ)dθ. (57)Hermalin & Katz Appendix B: Examples 39
























Clearly, the left-hand side of (58) cannot exceed the value of that expression





















0, if x ≤ 0 .
Suppose we maximized (59) ignoring the constraint that q(·) be non-decreasing.
That maximized value must be at least as great as the constrained maximum
of (59). Observe that the ﬁrst-order condition for the unconstrained problem
if q(θ) ≥ qu(θ) is the same as that of the original unrestricted monopolist’s
problem, (9); so, in these cases, q(θ)=qu(θ). Hence, optimally q(θ) ≤ qu(θ)
almost everywhere. Consequently, the top line of (58) is zero. But the re-
mainder of (58) cannot be positive by (27). By contradiction, we have shown
that Platform 0 can never oﬀer a household enough surplus to induce it to
multi-home.
Appendix B: Examples
It is useful to illustrate certain points using discrete examples. The following
analysis is a straightforward extension of the continuous case.
Assume that there is a ﬁnite number, N, of content types indexed so
that i<jimplies θi <θ j.L e tfi denote the probability a randomly drawn










Note mN = 0. Deﬁne
Ri(q) ≡ ρθi+1q − ρθiq.
As will become apparent, the fact that RN(·) is not deﬁned is not an issue.
The function Ri(·) is positive, strictly increasing, and convex on R+.A s
a consequence, Proposition 2 of Caillaud and Hermalin (1993) implies that
the monopolist’s proﬁt-maximization problem with respect to the choice of












≤ q1 ≤···≤qN . (61)
Let {ˆ q1,...,ˆ qN} denote the solution. Observe this solution must satisfy, for
each i, the following condition.
(ρ + σ)θi − mi(θi+1 − θi)ρ − c
 (ˆ qi)  0, (62)
where the expression is an equality if the relevant order restriction, condition
(61), doesn’t bind, is greater than zero if the upward restriction binds, and
is less than if the downward restriction binds.
If we impose the assumption that mi is non-increasing in i (i.e., a monotone
hazard rate), then it can be shown that (61) is not binding except, possibly,
at q
¯
.I nt h a tc a s e ,i fˆ qi =0o rq
¯
, then the left-hand side of expression (62) is
less than zero.





(ρ + σ)θiˆ qi − c(ˆ qi)
 
fi . (63)
31Caillaud and Hermalin’s Proposition 2 is a fairly straightforward extension of standard
results in mechanism design for two types or for a continuum of types to an arbitrary, but
ﬁnite, number of types.Hermalin & Katz Appendix B: Examples 41
























(the value of θ1 is set just above the value at which the unrestricted platform
would exclude that type). Suppose ρ = 100, σ = 50, and c(q)=q2/2, which
implies qw(θ) = 150θ, and assume q
¯
< 1/20.
Consider the unrestricted case ﬁrst. Using expression (62) and the fact






































⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


































≈ 89,017.7 >W u . 32

Example 2: Assume that c(q)=q2/2a n dθ is distributed on [0,1] according
































≈ .652 ≈ 2.88 ≈ .566

Example 3: Suppose F(·) is the uniform distribution, ¯ θ =1 ,c(q)=q2/2,
ρ =2 ,σ = 1, and, for convenience, set q
¯
=0 .N o t et h a t
m(θ)=1− θ.
Hence, from (9),
qu(θ)=m a x {0,3θ − 2(1 − θ)} =m a x {0,5θ − 2}.
32The precise diﬀerence between Wr and Wu is






33The Mathematica program used is available from the authors upon request.Hermalin & Katz Appendix B: Examples 43














































































































The ﬁrst-order condition for (11), utilizing the Envelope Theorem, is
ρ + σΛ
 (θ)(1 − θ)qr −
 



























































































In this example, the improved-quality eﬀect is positive but is dominated
by the negative exclusion and reduced-quality eﬀects. A single-product re-
striction reduces welfare from Wu =6 3 /50 to Wr =5 6 /50.
Hermalin & Katz References 44
References
Anderson, Simon P. and Stephen Coate, “Market Provision of Broad-
casting: A Welfare Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies, October 2005,
72 (4), 947–972.
Armstrong, Mark, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal
of Economics, in press.
Brander, James A. and Jonathan Eaton, “Product Line Rivalry,”
American Economic Review, June 1984, 74 (3), 323–334.
Caillaud, Bernard and Benjamin E. Hermalin, “The Use of an Agent
in a Signalling Model,” Journal of Economic Theory, June 1993, 60 (1),
83–113.
and , “Hidden-Information Agency,” 2000. http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/hermalin/mechread.pdf.
and Bruno Jullien, “Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermedia-
tion Service Providers,” RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2003, 34
(2), 309–28.
Champsaur, Paul and Jean-Charles Rochet, “Multiproduct
Duopolists,” Econometrica, May 1989, 57 (3), 533–557.
DeFraja, Giovanni, “Product Line Competition in Vertically Diﬀerentiated
Markets,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, May 1996, 14
(3), 389–414.
Deneckere, Raymond J. and R. Preston McAfee, “Damaged Goods,”
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Summer 1996, 5 (2), 149–
174.
Doyle, Chris and Jennifer C. Smith, “Market structure in mobile tele-
coms: qualiﬁed indirect access and the receiver pays principle,” Informa-
tion Economics and Policy, December 1998, 10 (4), 471–488.
Federal Communications Commission, “Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing,” In the Matter of Developing a Uniﬁed Intercarrier Compensation
Regime, April 2001.Hermalin & Katz References 45
Gabszewicz, Jean J, Didier Laussel, and Nathalie Sonnac, “Press
Advertising and the Political Diﬀerentiation of Newspapers,” Journal of
Public Economic Theory, 2002, 4 (3), 317–34.
Hotelling, Harold, “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal,M a r c h
1929, 39 (153), 41–57.
Katz, Michael L., “Multiplant Monopoly in a Spatial Market,” Bell Jour-
nal of Economics, Autumn 1980, 11 (2), 519–535.
Mussa, Michael and Sherwin Rosen, “Monopoly and Product Quality,”
Journal of Economic Theory, August 1978, 18 (2), 301–317.
Peˇ cari´ c, Josip E., Frank Proschen, and Yung Liang Tong, Con-
vex Functions, Partial Orderings, and Statistical Applications, San Diego:
Academic Press, 1992.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 06 2003,
1 (4), 990–1029.
and , “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,” RAND Journal of
Economics, in press.
Shaked, Avner and John Sutton, “Relaxing Price Competition Through
Product Diﬀerentiation,” Review of Economic Studies, January 1982, 49
(1), 3–13.
Spence, A. Michael, “Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation,” Bell Journal
of Economics, Autumn 1975, 6 (2), 417–429.
Varian, Hal R., “Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,” American Eco-
nomic Review, September 1985, 75 (4), 870–875.
Walras, L´ eon,“ L ’ ´ Etat et les Chemins de Fer,” Revue du Droit Public et de
la Science Politique, mai-juin et juillet-aoˆ ut 1897.
, “The State and the Railways,” Journal of Public Economics,F e b r u a r y
1980, 13 (1), 81–100. English translation by P. Holmes.